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Radical Dissents in International
Criminal Trials
Neha Jain*

Abstract
International criminal law, for much of its history, has been a law characterized by dissents.
However, international law scholarship has largely ignored the role of the dissenting opinion in shaping the discourse of international criminal law. This article critically examines
the nature and function of dissents at international criminal tribunals at a particularly crucial moment in the life of these courts, when the project of establishing accountability for
mass atrocity through criminal trials is increasingly under attack. The article argues that
the dissenting opinion is a crucial legal device that can have a transformative potential in
international criminal adjudication through its creation of a civic space for contestation that
paradoxically shores up the legitimacy of the international criminal trial. To this end, it constructs a discrete category of dissenting opinions at international criminal courts: ‘radical
dissents’. The content and rhetorical style of a radical dissent enables actors invested in the
project of international criminal justice to use it as a vital dissentient voice both within and
outside the courtroom. Agents who operate within the connes of the legal trial, such as
defendants, lawyers, appellate chambers and future judges, may channel its authority to challenge the idiom in which the majority judgment speaks. Likewise, the radical dissent could
provide a legal language through which academics, victims, civil society and other affected
communities continue to grapple with constructing and coming to terms with events that
defy human understanding.

1 Introduction
What role and purpose do trials serve in dealing with cases of mass atrocity? The conventional justication proffered by the lawyer is cast in terms of the standard aims
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of criminalization and punishment: retribution, deterrence and, less frequently, communication to the offender and the public that a wrong has been done for which the
offender must be held accountable by the state acting on behalf of the community.1
This litany of rationales has failed to impress critics of the enterprise of international
criminal law; trials for mass atrocity, at least in their current form, appear to satisfy
few of the objectives of trials for ‘ordinary’ crimes. elective prosecutions and the
impossibility of ‘proportional’ punishment, combined with scepticism about evaluations of desert in the context of mass atrocity, undermine the claim to retributive
justice.2 The prospect of true deterrence is remote given that perpetrators of mass
atrocity are rarely susceptible to rational cost-benet analyses.3 The bleak assessment
of the concrete practice of international and hybrid criminal tribunals from multiple
quarters has contributed to the general malaise surrounding the project of international criminal trials. The list of accusations against their operation and functioning
could scarcely be more damning: arbitrariness, selectivity, inefciency, neo-colonialism, anti-liberalism, to state just a few. Champions of international criminal trials
have thus offered an alternative account of the function served by international criminal trials – ‘their role in norm projection: [T]rials are expressive acts broadcasting the
news that mass atrocities are, in fact, heinous crimes and not merely politics by other
means.’4
This speculative claim is belied by the actual reception of the work of international
criminal tribunals in the communities most affected by them. At Nuremberg, while
the initial German public opinion on the fairness and legitimacy of the proceedings
of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) was largely positive, this gure changed
dramatically in the 1950s with 30 per cent of those polled stating that the trials were
unfair and 40 per cent claiming that the verdicts were too severe.5 The attitude of the
Japanese people towards the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE)
has similarly been described in negative terms as ‘passive acceptance’ combined with
unease and frustration.6 More recently, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has been under continuous assault for its alleged antierbian bias: over 72 per cent of the polled population considered the ICTY to be a
1

2
3

4

5

6

Auckerman, ‘Extraordinary Evil: Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice’,
15 Harvard Human Rights Journal (2002) 39, at 41–43.
Ibid., at 56–63.
Wippman, ‘Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice’, 23 Fordham Journal of
International Law (FJIL) (1999) 473. Cf. Akhavan, ‘Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice
Prevent Future Atrocities?’, 95 American Journal of International Law (AJIL) (2001) 7.
Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law’,
in . Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International Law (2010) 569, at 576; de Guzman,
‘Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive election at the International Criminal Court’, 33 Michigan Journal
of International Law (2012) 265, at 302; Amann, ‘Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide’,
2 International Criminal Law Review (2002) 93, at 118, 133; loane, ‘The Expressive Capacity of
International Punishment’, 43 Stanford Journal of International Law (2007) 39, at 83.
Burchard, ‘The Nuremberg Trial and Its Impact on Germany’, 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice
(JICJ) (2006) 800, at 813.
Futamura, ‘Japanese ocietal Attitude towards the Tokyo Trial from a Contemporary Perspective’, in
Y. Tanaka et al. (eds), Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited (2011) 35, at 42.
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threat to erbian interests in the year 2000, and while this gure has diminished
over the years, there is still signicant distrust of the ICTY among the erb population.7 Discontent has also been voiced against the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR), arguing that it has only prosecuted one side of the conict by
concentrating on predominantly Hutu defendants and ignoring crimes committed by
the Rwandan Patriotic Front.8 The International Criminal Court (ICC) has fared little
better. In addition to repeated concerns about criminal proceedings at the ICC affecting local transitional justice processes,9 the investigation and charging practice of the
ICC has been embroiled in charges of politicization. The ICC is perceived as favouring
investigations and prosecutions of one set of actors in the conict10 and as failing to
pursue actors or investigations in situations that would antagonize powerful states.11
Blame, and the concomitant responsibility for remedial action, has been laid at the
door of processes at the inception and conclusion of the trial process: prosecutorial
policies that are selective, biased or non-transparent12 and outreach programmes that
are under-resourced and ineffective.13 Little attention has been given to the importance of the form and content of the judgment or verdict as the legal text that communicates the normative message of the international criminal trial and the role of
international judges as norm entrepreneurs. This article focuses on a discrete category of legal texts that have a transformative potential in furthering the expressive
aims of international criminal trials: dissenting opinions.14 International criminal
law, for much of its history, has been a law characterized by dissents. From the judgment of Justice Radhabinod Pal at the IMTFE15 to the powerful opinions of Judges
7

8

9
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15

Arzt, ‘Views on the Ground: The Local Perception of International Criminal Tribunals in the Former
Yugoslavia and ierra Leone’, 603 Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science (2006) 226,
at 232.
Waldorf, ‘“A Mere Pretense of Justice”: Complementarity, ham Trials, and Victor’s Justice at the Rwanda
Tribunal’, 33 FJIL (2001) 1221, at 1258–1262.
ee, e.g., Human Rights Center, When the War Ends: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace,
Justice, and Social Reconstruction in Northern Uganda (2007), at 4, 34–35 (on the public perception of the
International Criminal Court’s [ICC] intervention in Uganda).
Ibid., at 18 (in Uganda); Congressional Research ervice (CR), CR Report for Congress, International
Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues (2008), at 28 (in the Democratic Republic of Congo).
. Hickey, ‘African Union ays ICC hould Not Prosecute itting Leaders’, The Guardian (12 October 2013),
available at www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/12/african-union-icc-kenyan-president; D. Bosco,
‘Why Is the International Criminal Court Picking Only on Africa’, Washington Post (29 March 2013),
available at www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-is-the-international-criminal-court-picking-onlyon-africa/2013/03/29/cb9bf5da-96f7-11e2-97cd-3d8c1afe4f0f_story.html.
ee, e.g., Waldorf, supra note 8, at 1258–1268, 1271–1276; Greenawalt, ‘Justice without Politics:
Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal Court’, 39 New York University Journal
of International Law and Politics (NYUJILP) (2007) 583; Danner, ‘Enhancing the Legitimacy and
Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court’, 97 AJIL (2003) 510.
D. Orentlicher, Shrinking the Space for Denial: The Impact of the ICTY in Serbia (2008), at 22, 78; Peskin,
‘Courting Rwanda: The Promises and Pitfalls of the ICTR Outreach Programme’, 3 JICJ (2005) 950, at
954–955.
For an exceptional effort to link dissenting opinions with the legitimacy of international criminal trials,
see Mistry, ‘The Paradox of Dissent: Judicial Dissent and the Projects of International Criminal Justice’,
13 JICJ (2015) 1.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Rabhadinod Pal, Judgment, Araki Sadao et al., 1 November 1948.
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Christine van den Wyngaert and Hans-Peter Kaul at the ICC,16 the dissent has loomed
large in nearly every major decision handed down by international criminal tribunals.
Yet, there has been no systematic study of the inuence of dissents in shaping the
discourse of international criminal justice both within and outside the courtroom.17
The article argues that the dissent has a vital performative function in the theatre
that is the criminal trial and that this role is especially important given the challenges
that confront efforts to establish legal accountability for mass atrocity crimes. To this
end, the article surveys dissenting opinions at the international and hybrid criminal
tribunals to highlight that not all dissenting opinions are created alike. While dissents
are an increasingly accepted and lauded feature of international adjudication more
generally, many of the arguments supporting the legitimation function of dissents do
not directly apply to a species of dissents that the article conceptualizes as ‘radical dissents’. Radical dissents, both due to their content and their form, explicitly acknowledge the distinctly political character of mass atrocity and, following from that,
recognize that any assessment of the responsibility for mass atrocity cannot escape
being a political act to some extent. In rejecting, either directly or by implication, a
comfortably sanitized version of events that defy human understanding, they have
the potential to create a civic space for contestation that paradoxically shores up the
legitimacy of the international criminal trial.
The article proceeds as follows. Part 2 gives an overview of the law and practice of
dissents at international and hybrid criminal tribunals. Part 3 carves out a species of dissents called ‘radical dissents’ and focuses on instances of international judicial dissents
that fall within this category and that have widely been regarded as having dramatically
shaped the international criminal legal discourse. Part 4 argues that radical dissents
make a distinctive set of contributions to the legal narrative of mass atrocity that must
be assessed in the context of the communicative project of international criminal justice.

2 The Law and Practice of Dissents at International
Criminal Courts
To the extent that scholars have paid any attention to dissents at international criminal tribunals, the academic commentary has typically focused on doctrinal issues18 or
on a particular case or even a specic judge.19 This narrow lens has led to an attenuated conception of dissents; scholarship that favours dissents lumps all varieties of
16

17
18

19

Minority Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert, Judgment, German Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07), Trial
Chamber II, 7 March 2014; Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome tatute on the Authorization
of an Investigation into the ituation in the Republic of Kenya, Situation in the Republic of Kenya (ICC01/09), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 31 March 2010.
For a notable recent, and only, exception, see Mistry, supra note 14.
luiter, ‘Unity and Division in Decision Making: The Law and Practice on Individual Opinions at the
ICTY’, in B. wart, A. Zahar and G. luiter (eds), The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (2011) 191; Jorgensen and Zahar, ‘Deliberation, Dissent, Judgment’, in G. luiter (ed.),
International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules (2013) 1151.
ee, e.g., Nandy, ‘The Other Within: The trange Case of Radhabinod Pal’s Judgment on Culpability’, 23
New Literary History (1992) 45; Kopelman, ‘Ideology and International Law: The Dissent of the Indian
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dissents into the same category and tends to rely on oft-repeated and well-worn justications for their permissibility with little regard for their specic position in trials
for mass atrocity. Alternatively, analyses of isolated dissents or judges rarely abstract
from the politics of individual cases to assess their transformative potential for international criminal justice as a whole. This section provides an overview of dissents at
international and hybrid tribunals to paint a better picture of the law and practice of
dissents in international criminal law.
imilar to the constitutive instruments of most international adjudicative bodies,20
the legal instruments establishing various international and hybrid criminal tribunals
have contemplated the possibility of dissents from the very rst trials for mass atrocity
crimes.21 Thus, the Charters of the IMT and the IMTFE both provided that decisions
at the tribunals will be made by majority vote, with the president’s vote functioning as
a tiebreaker.22 The IMT judgment saw a single dissenting opinion by the oviet member, Judge Iona Nikitchenko.23 In contrast, notwithstanding an initial understanding
on unanimity,24 no less than ve of the 11 judges at the IMTFE appended separate
or dissenting opinions.25 The statutes and rules of procedure and evidence of the
ICTY, the ICTR, the pecial Court for ierra Leone (CL) and the pecial Tribunal
for Lebanon (TL) all provide for a reasoned judgment by majority vote, to which separate and dissenting opinions may be appended.26 There are few other procedural or
other (publicly available) rules guiding the drafting and form of dissenting opinions,
though the CL has cautioned against signicant delays or gaps between the time
of publication of the majority judgment and that of the dissenting opinion.27 At the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, judges are required to attempt to

20

21

22

23
24
25

26

27

Justice at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial’, 23 NYUJILP (1991) 373 (focusing exclusively on Justice Pal the
man or on the International Military Tribunal for the Far East [IMTFE]).
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) stands out as a rare exception. ee Laffranque, ‘Dissenting Opinion
in the European Court of Justice’, 9 Juridica International (2004) 14. Also, the Appellate Body (AB) of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) permits separate opinions but requires them to be anonymous. Art.
17.11 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the ettlement of Disputes 1994, 1869 UNT
401: ‘Opinions expressed in the Appellate Body report by individuals serving on the Appellate Body shall
be anonymous.’
For a more comprehensive description of the deliberative processes and forms of judgment at the major
international and hybrid criminal tribunals, see Jorgensen and Zahar, supra note 18.
Art. 4(c) Charter of the International Military Tribunal 1945, 82 UNT 279; Art. 4(b) Charter of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE Charter) 1946, 4 Bevans 20 (as amended 26
April 1946).
Dissenting Opinion of Judge I.T. Nikitchenko, Judgment, Schacht, von Papen, Fritzsche and Hess and Others.
N. Boister and R. Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (2008), at 98.
ee B.V.A. Röling and C.F. Ruter (eds), The Tokyo Judgment: The International Military Tribunal for the Far
East (I.M.T.F.E.), 29 April 1946–12 November 1948 (1977). For a summary of some of these issues, see
luiter, supra note 18, at 198–199.
Art. 23(2) tatute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 1993, 32 ILM 1159
(1993); Art. 23(2) tatute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 1994, 33 ILM 1598
(1994); Art. 18 tatute of the pecial Court for ierra Leone 2002, 2178 UNT 138; Art. 23 tatute of
the pecial Tribunal for Lebanon, UN Doc. /RE/1757, 31 January 2007.
Decision on Brima-Kamara Defence Appeal Motion against Trial Chamber II Majority Decision, BrimaKamara (CL-2004-16-AR73), Appeals Chamber, 8 December 2005, paras 20–24.
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achieve unanimity at both the trial and appellate level and can only resort to decisions
by super-majority if this is not possible and append a separate or dissenting opinion.28
Finally, the Rome tatute of the International Criminal Court provides a somewhat
incomplete framework on the permissibility of dissents.29 While there is no provision
on whether or not dissents are permitted in the Pre-Trial Chamber, judges at the trial
level are enjoined to strive to achieve unanimity, failing which a decision shall be
taken by majority vote.30 No corresponding obligation of unanimity is specied for the
Appeals Chamber. Instead, the ‘judgement of the Appeals Chamber shall contain the
views of the majority and the minority, but a judge may deliver a separate or dissenting opinion on a question of law’.31
A treaty injunction permitting dissents says little about the extent to which judges at
courts may indulge in, or refrain from, dissenting as a matter of practice.32 A few elements complicate the effort to arrive at generalizable conclusions from the data on dissents in international criminal trials. Among these are the labelling of individual opinions
as ‘declarations’, ‘separate opinions’ and ‘dissenting opinions’, where it is often unclear
whether the content of the individual opinion matches the categorization. Further, some
judges account for a disproportionate percentage of dissenting opinions, which in turn
affects the analysis.33 Notwithstanding these challenges, scholars analysing judicial decision making in specic tribunals such as the ICTY have identied a consistent pattern in
the percentage of dissenting opinions across judges and over a period of time.34
One would assume that given the ubiquity of dissenting opinions in common law
countries, judges from a common law background would dissent more often than their
civil law brethren. However, this is not borne out by the data. In a fascinating empirical study of individual opinions at the ICTY, Allison Danner and Erik Voeten conclude
that while domestic legal background (civil versus common law) of the judge does not
seem to have much bearing on whether he or she is more likely to dissent, there is a
signicant statistical correlation between the proportion of common law judges on a
panel and the proportion of dissenting opinions.35 imilarly, there is some evidence
28

29

30
31
32

33

34
35

Art. 14 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Doc. N/RKM/1004/006,
27 October 2004; Rule 101(2) Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Internal Rules, as
revised on 16 January 2015.
ee luiter, supra note 18, at 203. The drafting history suggests that some countries favoured unanimous opinions. Jorgensen and Zahar, supra note 18, at 1178–1179. Rome tatute of the International
Criminal Court (Rome tatute) 1998, 2187 UNT 90.
Rome tatute, supra note 29, Arts 74(3), 74(5).
Ibid., Art. 83(4).
At the Appellate Body of the WTO, for instance, several institutional factors are considered to contribute
to the extremely low rate of dissents, including an informal agreement among its members favouring
unanimity and the costs of dissenting. Alvarez-Jimenez, ‘The WTO Appellate Body’s Decision-Making
Process: A Perfect Model for International Adjudication’, 12 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL)
(2009) 289, at 291.
luiter, supra note 18, at 206–207, 210–213 (noting that two judges account for 30 per cent of the individual opinions at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [ICTY]).
Ibid., at 204–206 (cataloguing individual and dissenting opinions at the ICTY).
Danner and Voeten, ‘Who Is Running the International Criminal Justice ystem?’, in D. Avant et al. (eds),
Who Governs the Globe? (2010) 35, at 66–68.
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that the previous professional background of the judge (judge versus government ofcial versus academic) inuences the propensity to dissent.36

3 Ordinary and Radical Dissents
Given the range and frequency of dissents, it is not surprising that the subject matter
of dissenting opinions runs the entire gamut of legal and factual disagreements, from
the mundane to the momentous. This part of the article argues that dissents of various kinds do not serve the same function in an international criminal trial. ‘Radical
dissents’ are substantively and stylistically distinct from ordinary dissents and can
have a dramatic inuence on the narrative of international criminal justice, which
transcends the trial and the verdict.

A Constructing the Radical Dissent
Judges at international criminal tribunals have clashed with their colleagues on jurisdictional,37 procedural (fair trial rights, standard of review),38 substantive (modes of
liability, denitions of crimes, defences),39 evidentiary (assessment of facts and evidence)40 and sentencing questions.41 This looks very much like the usual variety of
legal opinions of any shape and form in any court that hands down reasoned judgments. The scope of disagreement is typically an important substantive, procedural or
evidentiary legal or factual issue – at times, fairly narrow and technical while, at others, relatively wide-ranging and complex. The standard tone of the dissenting opinions is fairly legalistic, and there is no attempt to question the authority or bona des
36
37

38

39

40

41

Ibid., at 69.
ee, e.g., Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra note 16 (on the jurisdictional requirements of a crime
against humanity).
ee, e.g., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Georgios M. Pikis, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor
against the Decision of Trial Chamber I entitled ‘Decision on the Release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’,
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 12), Appeals Chamber, 21 October 2008 (on the violation of the accused’s rights to a fair trial); Judgment, Blaškić (IT-95-14-A) Appeals Chamber, 29 July
2004; Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weinberg de Roca, Judgment, Blaškić (IT-95-14-A) Appeals
Chamber, 29 July 2004 (on the standard of review).
ee, e.g., eparate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Odio Benito, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the
tatute, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06), Trial Chamber I, 14 March 2012 (on the denition of
crimes of enlistment, conscription and use of children under the age of 15 to participate actively in hostilities); Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge hahabuddeen, Judgment, Brdanin (IT-99-36-A), Appeals
Chamber, 3 April 2007 (on the elements of a joint criminal enterprise); eparate and Dissenting Opinion
of Judge Cassese, Judgment, Erdemović (IT-96-22-A), Appeals Chamber, 7 October 1997; Joint eparate
Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, Judgment, Erdemović (IT-96-22-A), Appeals Chamber, 7
October 1997; eparate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge tephen, Judgment, Erdemović (IT-96-22-A),
Appeals Chamber, 7 October 1997 (on the defence of duress).
Partially Dissenting Opinion and Declaration of Judge Lui, Judgment, Sainović (IT-05-87-A), Appeals
Chamber, 23 January 2014; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tuzmukhamedov, Judgment, Sainović (IT-0587-A), Appeals Chamber, 23 January 2014 (on the evaluation of evidence).
ee, e.g., Partially Dissenting Joint Opinion of Judges Agnieszka Klonowiecka-Milart and Chandra Nihal
Jayasinghe, Appeal Judgment, Kaing Guek Eav (001/18-07-2007-ECCC/C), upreme Court Chamber, 3
February 2012 (dissents on sentence imposed on the accused).
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of the court and its judges. These dissents rarely excite the wider public or invite much
comment beyond elite legal and political circles.
There have been some initial efforts to develop a more sophisticated typology of dissents in international criminal courts through the proposed category of ‘fundamental
dissents’. The term is used in two senses – it signals both the dissenting judge’s strong
sentiment with respect to the disputed issue and the status of the disputed issue as
fundamental to the legal outcome in the case.42 ome scholars argue that categorizing a dissent in this fashion is at best superuous (since dissents by their very nature
are fundamental to the decision) and at worst detrimental to the authoritativeness
of the majority decision.43 Others are favourably disposed to fundamental dissenting
opinions due to their role in interrogating the exercise of judicial power and, following from that, paradoxically contributing to the legitimacy of international criminal
trials.44
The term ‘fundamental dissent’, however, does not convey much except to suggest
that the disputed legal or factual issues might be more serious or grave than the typical scope of disagreement; the difference, thus, is one of degree rather than kind.
There is, however, a type of dissent that is of a different quality in its content, form and
intended audience: the radical dissent. The radical dissent, most crucially, is one that
critiques the authorized version of the historical, political and cultural portrait set up
by the trial and creates a civic space for counter-narratives to emerge and challenge
the idiom in which the majority judgment speaks and which it takes as a given.
The signicance of this contestation ows from the character of trials for international crimes: unlike the standard case of trials for ordinary crimes, extraordinary
criminality such as mass atrocity requires the construction of a broader context that
provides meaning and content to the conduct of the individual accused in the courtroom. This contextual setting is necessitated by the fact that an international crime,
unlike its domestic counterpart, is inherently collective in nature – for the perpetrator
as well as for the victim.45 While the perpetrator of a crime such as ethnic cleansing or
aggression is individually culpable, he invariably commits this crime on behalf of, or in
furtherance of, a collective criminal project, be it that of a state or some other authority.46 The hypothetical gure of the lone génocidaire hardly ever exists in practice: the
perpetrator is part of, and acts within, a social structure that inuences his conduct
and in conjunction with other people.47 imilarly, the victims of international crimes
are also mostly chosen not based on their individual characteristics but, rather, based
on their actual or perceived membership in a collective.48 International crimes are also
42
43
44
45

46
47
48

Jorgensen and Zahar, supra note 18, at 1191; Mistry, supra note 14, at 2.
Jorgensen and Zahar, supra note 18, at 1191–1192.
Mistry, supra note 14, at 2–3.
Fletcher, ‘The torrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt’, 111 Yale
Law Journal (2002) 1499, at 1514; Fletcher and Weinstein, ‘Violence and ocial Repair: Rethinking the
Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation’, 24 Human Rights Quarterly (2002) 573, at 605.
loane, supra note 4, at 56.
Ibid.
Drumbl, ‘Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity’, 99
Northwestern University Law Review (2005) 539, at 571.
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collective in the sense that they are committed with the consciousness on the part of
the individual perpetrator that he is part of a common project. As academics have
noted in their studies of the phenomenon of mass atrocity, more often than not, there
is a ‘communal engagement with violence’.49
The nature of international crimes such as genocide, or crimes against humanity
that are committed as a systematic and widespread attack against a civilian population, entails that notwithstanding the best efforts of international judges, it will be
very difcult to hold an individual defendant responsible for this crime without venturing into some explanation of the collective context that renders this crime possible
and capable of description.50 If the context itself cannot be questioned, the assessment
of the accused’s responsibility can seem pre-determined.51 The radical dissent does not
merely focus on legal or factual issues relevant to the individual conduct or mental
state of the accused but, in addition, also queries this contextual narrative.
In broadening the contextual enquiry to include socio-economic, political and historical factors that are typically beyond the ken of a standard courtroom, the radical
dissent challenges and reminds its audience of the way in which power, especially the
imbalance in global political power, structures and limits the discourse surrounding
the causes of, and responsibility for, atrocity. In this guise, it partakes of the character
of an explicitly intellectual/political movement that interrogates authority. While the
radical dissent may be primarily oppositional in character, it can also be reconstructionist and offer an alternative account of the narrative of mass atrocity and of the
roles played by different parties in its orchestration and resolution. The version of history that emerges from the attempt to construct a counter-narrative might then be
less linear, fragmentary and embrace gaps, ambiguities and contradictions.
tylistically, radical dissents eschew any attempts at apology and appropriate many
of the elements of the rhetorical style of majority judgments, thus seeking to regain
some of the ground that is lost since the dissenting judge no longer ‘speaks for the
court’.52 Rhetorically, the radical dissent is directed not only, or not even primarily,
to the fellow judges on the court but also to the wider constituency of the potential
stakeholders in the project of international criminal justice. The radical dissent may
be forcefully individualistic in its tone, and, to the extent that remarks are addressed to

49
50

51

52

Fletcher and Weinstein, supra note 45, at 605.
Damaska, ‘What Is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’, 83 Chicago-Kent Law Review, (2008)
323, at 359–360 (exploring this tension between the individualization of responsibility and the broader
didactic focus of international criminal trials). ee also Osiel, ‘Why Prosecute? Critics of Punishment for
Mass Atrocity’, 22 Human Rights Quarterly (2000) 118, at 126–127 (illustrating this problem through
the trials of junta trials in Argentina).
Koskenniemi, ‘Between Impunity and how Trials’, 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2002)
1, 17–18.
ee, e.g., the apologetic tone and attempt to downplay the issue by the dissenter in WTO, United States –
Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/D246, where every attempt is made to maintain collegiality and reach
consensus. Kolsky Lewis, ‘The Lack of Dissent in WTO Dispute ettlement’, 9 JIEL (2006) 895, at 903–
904. For the rst century of the court’s history, dissents at the U upreme Court also struck an apologetic note. Note ‘From Consensus to Collegiality: The Origins of the “Respectful” Dissent’, 124 Harvard
Law Review (HLR) (2011) 1305.
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the other members of the court, they rarely exhibit the hope or expectation of a continued dialogue and at times veer towards the other extreme of reproachful or even
accusatory denunciations.53 In some cases, the refusal to engage comes at a serious
cost to civility. The radical dissent typically avoids a point-by-point rebuttal of the legal
or factual analysis set out in the majority judgment; instead, it seeks to construct its
own version of the dispute and refutes the majority’s argumentation within the structure of the dissenting opinion’s discourse. In this sense, it aspires to equal the ‘monologic’ stance of the majority opinion: it appropriates alternative voices and allows
differences to be aired but only to the extent they can be addressed and answered
within the controlling narrative of the dissenting opinion.54
The content and rhetorical style of the radical dissent often lends it a peculiarly
ritualistic quality that highlights and reinforces the character of the trial as performance. The radical dissent will usually display a distinctly extra-legal sensibility, both
in the language it speaks and in what it chooses to include or exclude as relevant and
material information for the adjudication of the narrower legal issue in contention. In
this sense, it has an explicit or implicit outward-looking character. The non-technical,
non-jurisprudential elements of the dissent have the ability to draw in and speak to
various legal and non-legal audiences, although its dramatic impact may not be immediately visible and may take months or even years to percolate into the wider public
consciousness and debate. This dissemination process is largely beyond the inuence
or control of the dissenting judge (who might, however, choose to hurry it along by
generating some of the publicity), and the dissent, once unleashed, is susceptible to be
taken up, and even put to unforeseen ends, by multiple constituencies.55
These characteristics may be present to a greater or lesser degree across dissents,
individually or together, but it is their combination that lends the dissent its radical
potential. The category of radical dissents, however, should not be taken as suggesting
a binary distinction between radical and ordinary dissents: dissenting opinions can be
on a spectrum ranging from those that embody all three features of the radical dissent,
those that come close to it, those that share only some of these elements and others
still that serve entirely different purposes and functions.

B Radical Dissents at International Criminal Tribunals
Given the elements that are required to constitute a radical dissent, they will usually
represent a small fraction of judicial opinions in any tribunal or regime. This section
53
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highlights the elements of a radical dissent through an analysis of some of the canonical dissents by judges of international criminal courts. Arguably the most famous
dissent in international criminal law, Justice Pal’s dissent at the IMTFE bears all of
the hallmarks of the radical dissent. Justice Pal’s ‘explosive’ dissent,56 spanning 1,235
pages and resulting in the acquittal of all ‘Class A’ defendants for crimes against peace
is widely regarded as a comprehensive challenge to the majority judgment’s construction of the narrative of Japanese aggression involving a far-ranging conspiracy to
dominate parts of Asia and the Indian and Pacic Oceans57 and the casting of the
Allies as liberal defenders.58 The dissent covered a vast amount of ground, ranging
from a positivist critique of the law governing the criminalization of crimes against
peace and crimes against humanity to challenging the historical context of Japanese
actions.59 As a matter of pure positive law, Justice Pal argued that the IMTFE Charter,
criminalizing the categories of ‘crimes against peace’ and ‘crimes against humanity’,
had no basis in pre-existing international law and that this position remain unchanged
notwithstanding the conclusion of the Pact of Paris and developments in customary
international law.60 Exposing the power dynamics at play in including these crimes
under the IMTFE Charter, he declared:
The so-called trial held according to the denition of crime now given by the victors obliterates the centuries of civilization which stretch between us and the summary slaving of those
defeated in a war. A trial with law thus prescribed will only be a sham employment of legal
process for the satisfaction of a thirst for revenge. It does not correspond to any idea of justice. uch a trial may justly create the feeling that the setting up of a tribunal like the present
is much more a political than a legal affair, an essentially political objective having thus been
cloaked by a juridical appearance.61

More crucially, in his reconstruction of Japan’s conduct during the war, Justice Pal
sought to explain Japanese acts of aggression in the context of Western colonial policies and imperialism. Rejecting any attempt to portray the denition of ‘aggression’ as
a neutral exercise,62 he immediately related the charge of aggression to the state’s prerogative to act in self-defence and shifted Japan’s conduct from the ‘aggressive’ (and
illegitimate) to the ‘defensive’ (and justied) side of the scale.63 ince Japan had acted
in the genuine belief that its security was under threat, its conduct fell into the rubric
of self-defence, even if the immediate threat was not military in character. Among the
56
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Kopelman, supra note 19, at 377.
Comyns Carr, ‘The Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East’, 34 Transactions
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Mistry, supra note 14, at 12.
For a comprehensive analysis of the main issues highlighted in Pal’s critique, see Kopelman, supra note
19. This section will touch on only a few of the instances that demonstrate its radical character.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Pal, supra note 15, at 33–37, 104, 126, 151–152. Pact of Paris 1928, 94
LNT 57.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Pal, supra note 15, at 37 (emphasis in original).
Kopelman, supra note 19, at 419–423.
ellars, ‘Imperfect Justice at Tokyo and Nuremberg’, 21 European Journal of International Law (2011)
1085, at 1096.
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threats he included in this category were the rise of Chinese communism and Western
support of anti-Japanese economic policies.64
Contrary to its subsequent depiction by Japanese revisionist historians, the dissent did not absolve Japan of culpability altogether. Justice Pal criticized Japanese
actions in various theatres of war, particularly events such as the Manchurian
Incident and the Japanese establishment of Manchuko.65 However, he rejected the
prosecution’s attempt to frame this conduct as part of a consistent and deliberate Japanese conspiracy to dominate the world, which the prosecution likened to
the conduct of Nazi Germany.66 His opinion berated the prosecution for erecting a
conspiracy edice that presented a series of discrete events spanning more than a
decade, and marked by a combination of foresight, accident and surprise, as a linear historical progression with a calculated object. To him, this represented a hopelessly simplistic and inaccurate judgment on the historical evolution of an entire
nation.67
Even more tellingly, Justice Pal considered Japanese acts of aggression as motivated
by, and seeking to imitate, Western colonialism.68 In the aftermath of the conclusion
of unequal treaties between Japan and various Western powers in the late Edo period,
Japanese actions to revise these treaties took the form of imitating Western modes of
thinking and actions. This led Japan to adopt a policy of territorial expansion, similar
to that adopted by the West in different parts of the world, including the eastern hemisphere.69 The implication was obvious: the Allies, as victors, were castigating Japan
for the very conduct that their own policies had perpetuated. In the words of Ashis
Nandy, ‘Pal set the Japanese imperial guilt in this century in a larger global context. If
the accused were guilty, the plaintiffs were guilty too’.70
Rhetorically, from the very outset, Justice Pal’s dissent structured the legal and factual analysis in its own terms, setting out in clear detail the priority and ordering of
the issues relevant for the disposal of the case.71 Moreover, in evaluating the evidence
and marshalling arguments dismissing the claims of the prosecution, the dissent
pointedly refrained from even referencing the majority judgment; this was in marked
contrast to extensive citations to the legal propositions stemming from the judgment
of the IMT at Nuremberg. triking a highly individualistic note, Justice Pal quoted the
arguments of the prosecution in some detail and assessed and refuted them as if he
were the sole authority tasked with their adjudication.72
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Y. Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II (2009), at 219.
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The deliberate omission to allude to the majority judgment is hardly surprising
given Justice Pal’s attitude towards the majority that was revealed in a subsequent
speech he gave at Hiroshima in the aftermath of the trials, where he characterized the
majority decision as having been written ‘on an emotional impulse’ that was devoid of
evidence and analysis in contrast to his own thoroughly researched and comprehensively argued opinion.73 Indeed, having decided relatively early on in the trial proceedings to register his dissent,74 Justice Pal did not even attend a signicant proportion
of the court proceedings and closeted himself in his lodgings to personally collate the
facts and evidence he felt he needed to write his lengthy opinion.75 In this feat though,
it must be noted that he was eclipsed by the frequent absences of Judge ir William
Webb, the president of the tribunal, who journeyed regularly to Brisbane during the
course of the trial.76
Justice Pal’s was not the only dissent at the IMTFE; arguably, it was not even the one
that had the most compelling legal logic or the most penetrating grasp of the facts and
evidence.77 However, it was Justice Pal’s dissent that captured the Japanese imagination and that has since been instrumental in shaping the Japanese collective memory
of the events leading up to World War II.78 For critics of the Tokyo trial, the acquittal of the accused and the absolution of Japan from having plotted and engaged in
an aggressive war were a vindication of Japan as a nation and an exposé of Western
hypocrisy.79 Justice Pal himself became a household name; to him were dedicated
memorials, shrines and even a haiku by the wartime prime minister, Hideki Tojo.80
Parts of the dissenting opinion were misappropriated to support and further the
right wing revisionist discourse of the legitimacy of the Greater East Asia War and
to denounce the Tokyo proceedings.81 This position shifted in the 1980s with a new
generation of progressive historians who argued that the real failing of the Tokyo trial
was that it had not gone far enough, highlighting, among other things, the failure to
prosecute the Allied powers’ crimes in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.82
The different causes that Justice Pal’s opinion seems to serve is perhaps equally a
product of its deeply ambiguous nature: as scholars have pointed out, the opinion
teeters between a conservative, staunchly positivist approach to the rule of law, a distinctly Asian and nationalistic spirit and a radical anti-colonial critique of Western
hypocrisy.83 Nonetheless, whether invoked by the right or the left, the most important
73
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legacy of Justice Pal’s dissenting opinion has been ‘to open up a space in Japanese
political culture to argue about and debate questions of responsibility arising out of
the Asia-Pacic War’84 – questions that may have been harder to raise or address in
its absence.85
Another, more recent, judicial opinion that has received very little attention but
that has features of a radical dissent is the appellate opinion of Judge George Gelaga
King in the Fofana case at the CL.86 While supercially a legal analysis of the contextual requirements for a crime against humanity, the dissent challenged the majority’s narrative of the role of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) in the conict in ierra
Leone and Western participation in, and support of, CDF forces. The narrow issue
that was the subject of the dissent was the Appeals Chamber’s overruling of the Trial
Chamber’s determination that the civilian population had not been the primary target
of attacks carried out by the CDF in various parts of ierra Leone. According to the
Trial Chamber’s judgment, while the attacks were widespread and systematic, since
they were intended to target rebels and juntas, they were not directed against any
civilian population as required by the legal denition of crimes against humanity.87
In a manner reminiscent of Justice Pal’s dissent, Judge King did not merely offer a
technical refutation of the majority judgment’s legal and factual analysis. Instead, he
addressed, on his own terms, whether the evidence was sufcient to prove the nature
of, and intent motivating, the attacks by framing it in the context of the history of
ierra Leone and objects and purposes of the CDF.88 The CDF was the nodal force consisting of traditional ‘Kamajors’ (hunters) who had been trained as vigilantes at the
outbreak of the civil war by ierra Leonean armed forces and other militias and civil
defence forces.89 The CDF, with the accused Hinga Norman at its helm, was expected
to coordinate with the Economic Community of West African tates Monitoring
Group (ECOMOG) to restore the democratically elected government of ierra Leone
and defeat dissident military groups.90 ECOMOG, with the assistance of Nigeria and
Britain, even went so far as to supply the CDF with nancial and logistical support.91
For Judge King, the fact that the CDF was engaged in a conict with the rebel forces
to restore to power the Western-backed democratically elected government of ierra
Leone was entirely germane to evaluating whether the CDF had carried out attacks
directed at the civilian population.92 Having recharacterized and contextualized the
aims of the CDF, Judge King assessed the Trial Chamber’s ndings on the nature of the
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CDF’s attacks within this framework to conclude that they were directed towards the
achievement of military objectives.93
Judge King also took issue with the factual ndings of the Appeals Chamber on the
charge of war crimes, ending on a note that queried whether Western powers, including the United Kingdom and the UA, and ECOMOG, who supported the CDF, should be
held liable alongside it for having been complicit in the alleged war crimes.94 Drawing
an analogy with the failure to pursue prosecutions for alleged war crimes by the forces
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Yugoslavia, he insinuated that if international criminal trials were experiments in victor’s justice they should perhaps initially
focus on the more developed nations, lest they be accused of double standards.95
Judge King’s opinion followed on the heels of several other attempts at dissentient
strategies undertaken during the course of the trial.96 Even at the trial stage, one of
the three accused, am Hinga Norman, having initially dismissed his entire legal team,
made an opening statement at the trial’s resumption refusing to answer the charges
levied by the prosecution and claiming that the court lacked constitutional authority.97 In the words of Tim Kelsall, ‘Norman was at least as interested in being tried in
the court of public opinion as he was in a court of law’ and marked his repudiation
of the trial by boycotting most of the proceedings.98 Both Norman and the defence
team also used various tactics to try and shift the discourse by moving the focus away
from the narrow legal issue of his individual conduct to that of the broader political context of the ierra Leone conict and the role played in it by the CDF. The Trial
Chamber was, however, not persuaded as to the materiality and relevance of the evidence, and these efforts ultimately foundered and were abandoned in the later defence
strategies for the trial.99 Indeed, at the trial stage, the prosecution and the bench were
emphatic in their characterization of the CL proceedings as a ‘non-political’ trial,100
a portrayal that carried through in the nal verdicts that massively downplayed the
identity of the CDF as a political movement.101 The proceedings against Norman were
terminated due to his death caused by a medical condition, while the judgment and
sentence on the remaining CDF accused was delayed, but not before widespread speculation on their potential impact on the national elections, given that the CDF enjoyed
considerable support among various parts of the ierra Leonean population.102
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Viewed against this background, it is not entirely clear why Judge King’s dissent,
while nearly as critical as that of Justice Pal, has not garnered almost any legal or
academic commentary.103 Nor does it seem to have inuenced the national debate
in ierra Leone. This is a notable oversight, as the CL trial records are considered
likely to constitute one of the most important historical records of the ierra Leone
conict.104 It is difcult to speculate on the reasons for this reception – it is conceivable that Judge King, who hails from ierra Leone, cannot claim the impartiality and
independence that was Justice Pal’s due, or perhaps it is simply too early to try and
judge the legacy of the CL (and the dissent) for the public debate on the civil war in
a country that is still too shattered for any robust engagement with its past.
Elements of a radical dissent can be found in another blistering opinion rendered
very recently, this time at the ICTY: the dissent of Judge Flavia Lattanzi in Šešelj.105
Vojislav Sešelj, the president of the erbian Radical Party and a member of the
Assembly of the Republic of erbia, was acquitted by the ICTY Trial Chamber of all
charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes for his participation in crimes
alleged to have been committed by erbian nationalists against Croat and other nonerb civilian populations during the conict from August 1991 to eptember 1993.106
To determine Sešelj’s individual responsibility, the majority judgment deemed it
necessary to address the prosecution’s central thesis that the crimes were committed
in pursuit of the ideology of a ‘Greater erbia’, which involved the establishment of
a territorially unied erbia through the forcible displacement of non-erb populations inhabiting parts of the former Yugoslavia considered to be ‘erbian’ land.107 The
majority rejected this claim, arguing that the prosecution had omitted to situate the
creation of autonomous erbian regions in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)
within the context of the latter’s secession. While the establishment of erbian local
institutions in Croatia and BiH and the declaration of autonomy might be considered
discriminatory, it was not a criminal enterprise. Sešelj’s vision of a Greater erbia,
and his participation, whether directly or indirectly, in these actions, were thus part
of a political rather than a criminal plan. Given this context, all of his actions, such
as the recruitment and deployment of erb volunteers and cooperation with other
erb forces – could be interpreted to be in furtherance of the war effort and were not
103
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criminal in character. Furthermore, his conduct occurred in a scenario where all the
different factions in Croatia and BiH, including Croatian and Muslim civilians, were
arming and preparing to ght for the land they claimed as rightfully belonging to
them. Therefore, it would be incorrect to label the erbs as unilateral occupiers acting
in furtherance of a criminal plan to forcibly remove non-erbian civilians from these
territories.108
From the very outset, Judge Flavia Lattanzi made no effort to conceal her contempt
for, and disappointment with, the majority judgment, claiming that the addition of
the term ‘partial’ to her dissent was but a euphemism, given that, ‘unusually for a
dissenting opinion’, her disagreement could hardly be more complete on every aspect
of the case including the context, the law, the evidence, the analysis and the conclusions.109 he upbraided the majority for blaming the prosecution, rather than the Trial
Chamber as a whole, for the poor handling of the case110 and consistently criticized
the judgment for its failure to apply the correct law, properly evaluate the evidence
and supply clear reasoning or, indeed, any reasoning at all for its conclusions.111
Judge Lattanzi disagreed vehemently with the majority’s characterization of the
criminal enterprise in pursuit of the plan of establishing a Greater erbia and the
accused’s role in its effectuation, both as a matter of method and content.112 The
ICTY’s Trial Chamber II had previously determined that the alleged purpose of the
joint criminal enterprise, as stated in paragraph six of the indictment, was the ‘permanent forcible removal … of the Croat, Muslim, and other non-erb populations from
approximately one-third of the territory of the Republic of Croatia and large parts of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and from parts of Vojvodina … in order to make these areas
part of a new erb-dominated state’.113 The majority cited this statement, which contained specic criminal charges, but went on to equate it with the political goal of
establishing a Greater erbia.114 In doing so, it distorted the prosecution’s allegation
that the political vision of a Greater erbia was both the reason for, and a natural consequence of, an explicitly criminal enterprise.115
The dissenting opinion was severely critical of the majority’s further interpretation
of this political context. Judge Lattanzi traced the political history of the dissolution
of the former Yugoslavia and the various armed conicts that resulted from this dissolution.116 While the majority had characterized the conict between erb forces, on
the one hand, and Croatia and BiH, on the other, as one between opposing ‘military
forces with civilian components’,117 the dissenting opinion clearly interpreted them as
108
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widespread and systematic attacks of persecution, murder, torture, sexual violence,
other inhumane treatment and acts of destruction of villages and places of religious
signicance, directed by the erb forces against the civilian population with a view to
their forcible expulsion from these territories.118
After conducting an exhaustive analysis of the evidence supporting the charges
of crimes against humanity and war crimes against the accused, Judge Lattanzi concluded by accusing the majority of not only displaying contempt for the court’s own
previous jurisprudence on international humanitarian law but also of having strayed
from its mandate to adjudicate the individual criminal responsibility of the accused.119
According to Judge Lattanzi, the majority judgment had engaged in a reinterpretation
of the historical basis of the armed conict in Yugoslavia that portrayed some of the
violence as ‘inevitable’.120 Her closing statement, reecting her overall assessment of
the majority judgment, could not have been more damning: ‘[W]ith this Judgment we
have been thrown back centuries into the past, to a period in human history when we
used to say – and it was the Romans who used to say this to justify their bloody conquests and the assassinations of their political enemies during civil wars: “Silent enim
leges inter arma.”.’121
Not much time has elapsed since the verdict in Šešelj, and an authorized English
translation of Judge Lattanzi’s dissent, which was originally in French, has been made
available only fairly recently. However, the broader public reaction, both to the judgment and the dissent, has been electric.122 The judgment has been described as ‘comprehensively bad’, ‘a asco’, ‘a stain on the Tribunal’s reputation’, as ‘reinforcing
diverging ethnic realities in the Balkans’123 and as a ‘great victory for bloated, violent
lunatics everywhere’.124 Various academic commentators and media blogs have been
deeply critical of the majority judgment and have speculated on its implication for
erbia’s politics and prospects for accession to the European Union, while Croatia has
banned Sešelj from entering the country.125 Unsurprisingly, the prosecution has led
an appeal comprehensively challenging the majority’s reasoning on the facts and law
and labelling it a ‘uniquely inadequate adjudication of the case’ that ‘risks seriously
118
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undermining the credibility of the ICTY and the MICT’.126 The prosecution’s appeal
brief draws liberally on several points in Judge Lattanzi’s dissent,127 which has been
quoted widely in scholarly and public criticism of the judgment and is already proving to be pivotal in discussions within and outside the courtroom.128 Judge Lattanzi,
like Justice Pal, has been unusually vocal in giving expression to her disdain for the
majority’s reasoning, claiming to have personally suffered a great deal at the way the
judgment was reached and stating that the ‘ruling amounts to nothing’ because ‘it is
done so poorly, both in fact and law, that it is a nullity’.129

4 The Transformative Potential of Radical Dissents
Trials for mass atrocity differ from trials for ordinary crimes in signicant ways. The
most important of these is that the conduct they prosecute is invariably collective in
nature and intimately tied to broader social and political narratives of the imagined
identity of a nation. This part argues that, given the nature of mass atrocity, it is not
possible for an international criminal trial to completely individuate responsibility
without pronouncing in some fashion on this broader context. The need for the latter judgment and the inevitability of its truncated nature is one of the most serious
threats to the legitimacy of international criminal trials. The radical dissent serves to
shore up this legitimacy decit by opening up a public space that allows evaluations of
the broader political and historical context to be contested. In this process, however, it
is important not to underestimate the very real costs it can impose on the integrity of
the judicial ofce and on the real or perceived need for closure.

A The Communicative Function of International Criminal Trials
Lawyers, and legal trials, are typically self-conscious of their limitations. The trial process, with its adversarial structure, forensic approach to facts and tight legal framework is not well placed to generate accurate or even approximate grand narratives.
Neither does the legal training of a judge, who must additionally operate within the
limitations imposed by the rules of evidence and the practical challenges of the timeand resource-constrained trial, enable her to perform the job of a historian or a social
scientist. It is for this reason that scholars have been critical of attempts by international criminal trials to engage in pedagogy and history telling.130 Indeed, sceptics suggest that trials for mass atrocity should refrain from embarrassing forays into complex
126
127
128

129

130

Prosecution Appeal Brief, Judgment, Šešelj (MICT-16-99-A), Appeals Chamber, 18 July 2016, paras 1–9.
Ibid., paras 16, 46, 78, 122, 135, 149, 198.
Milanovic, supra note 123; Prelac, supra note 125; N. Buckley, ‘Karadzic and eselj Decisions
Risk Reputation of ICTY’, Financial Times (1 April 2016), available at www.ft.com/content/
a74ea278-b60a-349c-8af0-1554f34883ad.
A. Oskari Rossini, Šešelj Verdict: The Dissenting Judge (8 April 2016), available at www.balcanicaucaso.
org/eng/Areas/erbia/eselj-verdict-the-dissenting-judge-169740 (recounting an interview with Judge
Flavia Lattanzi).
ee, e.g., Damaska, supra note 50, at 336–338; Koskenniemi, supra note 51, at 2–3, 16–19; impson,
supra note 84, at 28.

1182

EJIL 28 (2017), 1163–1186

historical and societal assessments and do exactly what domestic criminal trials purport to do: adjudicate the individual criminal responsibility of the defendant before the
court in light of his actions and mental state.131
However, this is a myopic view of the way in which even ‘ordinary’ criminal trials operate and certainly runs contrary to the experience of trials for mass atrocity.
A domestic criminal trial for a garden variety wrong such as theft may purport to be
above politics and history, and, indeed, the technical, sanitized terms in which legal
proceedings are typically cast strive to emphasize the mundane, legalistic and apolitical character of the trial and judgment. The non-legal world, nonetheless, often
intrudes; is it plausible to divorce the legal question of consent in a trial for the offence
of rape, for example, from broader enquiries about sexual mores in a community or
to ignore issues of race and class when discussing appropriate uses of force by police
forces in a highly racialized and unequal society?
This inability to articially isolate the conduct of the individual accused in the
trial from larger societal forces and perceptions and to conne the judgment to rigidly legal dimensions is only amplied when adjudicating responsibility for crimes
that are inherently collective in nature. And once any judicial statement as to this
collective context is made, no matter how narrow or qualied it is, the message as to
the collective judgment will be transmitted and taken up by multiple stakeholders in
international criminal justice. One only has to look to the academic, public and media
reaction sparked by the majority judgment in Šešelj, even though it went out of its
way to emphasize that ‘[t]he Chamber’s ndings … do not claim to establish the entire
truth about the events that occurred, let alone to recount the complex history of a
conict’.132
The judgment of an international criminal tribunal has this expressive effect in
part due to the semantic authority that courts, and, by extension, judges, possess in
the creation and dissemination of norms.133 Judges, of course, are not the only dissentient voices in the trial. Discordant notes may be struck both within and outside
the courtroom at various stages of the trial by the media, by civil society groups, by
defence counsel and by the accused himself. From lobodan Milošević at the ICTY to
amuel Hinga Norman at the CL, history is replete with defendants using the trial,
both domestic and international, as a stage for civil disobedience and a high prole
forum for communicating their version of the story. One only has to think of famous
or infamous trials in domestic courts around the world where defendants like Nelson
Mandela or Mahatma Gandhi used the trial as a device for moral education and messaging. In trials for mass atrocity, some of the most dramatic oppositional moments
have been produced by the accused themselves, such as the image of Adolf Eichmann
seated in a glass booth, transformed into a petty bureaucrat conducting his defence in
clinical fashion.
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In this cacophony of discordant narratives, the radical dissent, emanating as it
does from the exercise of the judicial function, occupies a unique function. While the
counter-narrative generated by the accused, defence counsel or constituencies outside
the courtroom, such as the media, may be dismissed as ignorant, biased or hyperbolic,
a statement or decision pronounced by an adjudicator endowed with the authority of the judicial ofce generates the expectation that it will and must be taken into
account in any subsequent judicial or extrajudicial consideration of the dispute.134
The judge, unlike the defendant, is charged with the duty of impartiality and fairness
as an integral part of the judicial function. While the accused, defence, prosecution,
witnesses and victims might all be dismissed as advocates for their own partial vision
of the truth, the judge is expected to recognize no authority greater than the law and
favour no position that cannot be grounded in a rigorous evaluation of the law, facts
and evidence. Politicians may rely on rumour and hearsay, the non-governmental
organization can plead condentiality of sources and the media or the academic may
speculate. None of these options for subterfuge or concealment are available to the
judge, who must adhere to strict rules of procedure and evidence, and whose analysis
and arguments must be backed by publicly accessible facts and the law. The experience of the radical dissenting opinions of Justice Pal and Judge Lattanzi demonstrates
that the Janus-faced character of the radical dissent enables actors invested in, and
impacted by, the project of international criminal justice to use it as a vital dissentient
voice both within and outside the courtroom. Agents who operate within the connes
of the legal trial, such as defendants, lawyers, appellate chambers and future judges,
may channel its authority to challenge the différend.135 Likewise, the radical dissent
could provide a legal language through which academics, politicians, victims, civil
society and other affected communities continue to grapple with constructing and
coming to terms with events that defy human understanding.

B Risks to the Normative Enterprise of International Criminal Justice
The discordant narrative generated by the radical dissent comes at a price, and, in
some cases, this price may be deemed too high for international criminal trials to be
able to full their normative function. The most obvious of these costs is the muddying of the central message sought to be conveyed by trials for mass atrocity: that these
were heinous acts that we cannot afford to see repeated and for which accountability
is imperative. It is not as if the radical dissent makes light of, or does not take seriously,
mass killing, tortures and rapes. However, it allows for contestation as to the occurrence of these crimes and their scale and scope, as to the motivations and intentions
of the individuals and collectivities that allegedly perpetrated these crimes and as to
the possibility of these crimes being justied or excused because of the circumstances
134
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in which they took place. Given the magnitude of the events and the stakes involved in
the very real need for closure and transition, there is a plausible claim that denies the
desire for, and legitimacy of, a space for contestation. Indeed, the law countenances
this possibility in other areas that touch upon mass atrocity, as evidenced by the prevalence of Holocaust denial laws and related legislation in various parts of the world.136
This is a position that invites sympathy but, nonetheless, needs further elaboration
in order to succeed in making a convincing case. The precise point of a trial – any
trial – is that no legal or factual issue that is of central importance to the case should
be beyond dispute. Are trials for mass atrocity truly so exceptional that in these specic cases we can set that presumption aside? And, if they are, what are these seminal
values or considerations that would justify overriding the cornerstone of a criminal
trial – closure, peace, prevention, victim protection?
Perhaps the greater concern with a radical dissent is the potential cost to the integrity of the judicial ofce. Not all dissents threaten the image or reputation of the court;
indeed, they can even enhance its stature by promoting judicial accountability and
independence,137 or heralding law reform or development by appealing to ‘the intelligence of a future day’,138 or assisting in the crafting of more intelligent and nely
reasoned majority judgments.139 However, the dissenting judge stands in danger of
compromising the judicial ofce if, either through the mode of his participation in the
trial or by virtue of the tone and content of his decision, he shows a lack of respect for
the court and the trial process. Arguably, Justice Pal’s dissent displays some of these
less laudatory features. It would not be uncharitable to Justice Pal to suggest that his
failure to even attend a signicant proportion of the trial proceedings, the dissenting
opinion’s pointed lack of engagement with the arguments of the majority and Justice
Pal’s subsequent public speeches on the competence and motives of his fellow judges,
might not only have served to erode condence in the institution of the trial as a whole
but could also have contributed to the opinion’s subsequent misappropriation by revisionist historians.
Of course, there is a different way of dissenting, even radically dissenting. This dissent takes seriously the legitimacy of the trial and the business of sitting in judgment,
alongside and in concert with the other members of the court, united in the belief
that it is not only possible but also imperative for the court to conduct the trial with
respect for due process and the rights of the accused and to reach a reasoned judgment based upon the facts, law and evidence. This philosophical difference is what
separates Judge Lattanzi’s dissent from Justice Pal’s opinion. The former does not question the authority of the ICTY to be conducting the trial, even as it acknowledges the
politics involved in doing so and engages fully with the reasoning and conclusions of
the majority while charting a different course for assessing the accused’s responsibility. imilar to Justice Pal, though, Judge Lattanzi’s ensuing remarks in her personal
136
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capacity on the quality of the judgment and judicial decision making tend towards a
less dialogic attitude towards the role of a judge.

5 Conclusion
In his critique of international criminal trials as ‘show trials’, Martti Koskenniemi
explores what he perceives as the paradox of trials for mass atrocity. If the trial permits
the accused to be a force for disruption and for challenging the complexity of the historical narrative, it will cease to be a venue for closure and fail to provide a conclusive
rendition of the events surrounding the crimes for which the accused is convicted. The
accused’s version of history will be elevated to the status of a competing account that
has enough credibility to be aired in the course of the trial, and his personal culpability and conviction will be presented as an integral part of a partial – and potentially
false – interpretation of the past.140 On the other hand, if the trial purports to be a
complete and denitive historical truth, it will be unable to achieve this authoritativeness except by preventing the accused from questioning this narrative. In the latter
case, it will be little better than a show trial.141
This article points to the radical dissent as the legal device that can simultaneously
navigate this paradox and demonstrate why the tension at its core is overstated. The
radical dissent questions the claim that international criminal trials for mass atrocity
are only legitimate or useful if they function as instruments for the establishment of an
irrefutable grand narrative, which is in turn necessary for healing, reconciliation and
closure. The point of the radical dissent is not to offer a better or more accurate version
of the truth; the account of the collective context in which the crime takes place will
be no more complete or credible simply because it is written by a single judge, or multiple judges, instead of being the product of a compromise between judges acting as a
collective entity. Rather, the radical dissent offers a counter-narrative, which draws its
authority from the majesty of the judicial ofce rather than from advocacy that is presumed partisan, to the sanitized and linear historical truth constructed by the ofcial
judgment. In doing so, it provides a civic space for the denitiveness of the historical
assessment to be debated – not only by the accused but also by multiple stakeholders
in the project of international criminal justice.142
The radical dissent is less of an attempt to speak truth to power and more of a mirror in which the politicization of power and the way it seeps into the judicial decision is reected. As Gerry impson observes, trials for international crimes are acts
of both remembrance and closure through their narration of ‘a historical episode in
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which good and evil are clearly identied and delineated’.143 This attempt at legitimation backres, however, when discordant voices such as disruptive defence strategies
(as practised by French lawyer Jacques Verges in the Klaus Barbie trial) or dissident
texts (such as Hannah Arendt on Eichmann) threaten to set up a counter-narrative.144
Rather than foreclosing debate over the contested issue, the dissent deliberately withholds the imprimatur deemed necessary for the settlement of a criminal, historical
and political dispute.
For those who favour the criminal trial as a forum for ofcial closure, history telling
and pedagogy, the counter-narrative generated by the radical dissent might be viewed
as an undesirable and unnecessary irritant in the judicial resolution of responsibility
for mass atrocity. This would include advocates who are cognizant of the simplication
this adjudication entails but who nonetheless believe that this is a price worth paying.
A more realistic and sober assessment of trials for international crimes would be to
acknowledge their limited ability to comprehend and articulate the evil that seems
extraordinary.145 On this view, by putting the ‘trial on trial’, the radical dissent serves
as a reminder of the limitations of the legal process while simultaneously functioning
as a catalyst for the potential, and, in all likelihood, more messy and less denitive,
resolution of the dispute. The creation and facilitation of this public space for debating the inevitably convoluted historical and political narrative produced by the ofcial
judgment may be one of the most valuable legacies of the international criminal trial.
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